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INTRODUCTION

Like the common law generally, products liability law and its
remedies have an historical ebb and flow. The last twenty years or
so, beginning roughly with the election of Ronald Reagan to the
White House in 1980, have seen a pro-business, anti-consumer cycle. During these last two decades, barrier after barrier has been
erected between persons injured by products and recovery for
those injuries. These barriers have come in many forms: intentional tort reform measures designed to curb manufacture liability
and cap damages, heightened liability and evidentiary standards
that make it more difficult for plaintiffs to prove their cases, and
procedural impediments to individual plaintiffs ability to control
their cases, minimize costs and collect judgments. This so-called
"Quiet Revolution" repudiated the alleged pro-consumer protection slant of the law, the courts and our society, making it increasingly difficult for injured persons to recover.! Driven by an obsession with the supposed social cost of manufacturer liability for
product related injuries, these reforms essentially became victim
take-away programs. 2 The insurance industry and ideologue commentators convinced legislatures, judges and jurors that America
was in the midst of a tort crisis that was imposing too high a cost on
3
businesses, stifling innovation and undermining the economy.
While tort reformers had mixed success in getting their legislative initiatives formalized into law, the national debate that the
proposals sparked, and the one-sided portrayal of the need for such
reforms, shifted public, judicial and juror attitudes against plaintiffs. The combination of this shift in attitude with reform measures that did get enacted into law-such as statutes of repose and
damages caps-has seriously changed the atmosphere encountered
in the courtroom by most plaintiffs: Added to this mix is a host of
1. James A. Henderson & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An EmpiricalStudy of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990). One
irony in the history of products liability law is that it was on the heel of these reforms-changes which some thought would be a bullet in the head of products
liability reform-that the most vociferous and successful calls for limits on plaintiffs' rights were heard. Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Inside The
Quiet Revolution in ProductsLiability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731, 733 (1992).
2. Robert L. Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 13, 22-23 (1988).
3. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REv. 4,5 (1983).
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developments not traditionally considered to be tort reform measures but that nonetheless impact plaintiffs' ability to maintain suit.
These include the evolution of federal preemption of many products liability causes of action, the adoption of a new standard for
the admissibility of expert opinion as set forth by the United States
Supreme4 Court in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals and its

progeny, the adoption of a heightened liability standard in the Restatement (Third) of Torts, the increasing specter of bankruptcy by

manufacturers facing multiple products claims and the establishment of an institutional Multi-District Litigation plaintiffs' bar that
exerts control, sometimes seemingly self-interested control, over
claims of plaintiffs who are not even their clients.
In the near future, all these forces will likely continue to shape
on-going reforms and changes in the law that will make it more and
more difficult for plaintiffs to maintain products suits. 5

The ulti-

mate scope and longevity of these reforms may soon be decided at
the polls. Tort reform measures that have been overturned as unconstitutional are beginning to appear on ballots as constitutional
amendments. More importantly, the Republican candidate for
president, George W. Bush, has made tort reform a major emphasis
of his political career.6 Should Bush, a man called a wholly owned
subsidiary of corporate America, ascend to the Presidency, he will
no doubt do all he can to accelerate the anti-consumer drift of
products liability law.
In the long term, however, the reversal of this protectivism of
product manufacturers is assured by the very rationale used to
champion it-cost. Tort reformers take a narrow view when they
compute the social cost of products liability rules. They ignore the
4. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993); Kumho Tire
Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149-53 (1999).
5. All predictions in this article are purposefully wishy-washy. It takes a certain arrogance to predict the future, and attempts at doing so can seem foolish in
retrospect. For example, in 1991, eminent tort commentators James A. Henderson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski wrote Stargazing: The Future of American Products Liability Law, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1332 (1991), in which they predicted that "to expect
that courts will open their doors to litigating the fate of politically unpopular
products such as cigarettes and alcoholic beverages, providing causes of action for
hundreds of thousands of alleged victims, is fantasy." Id. at 1337. By the end of
the 1990's, the cigarette industry had agreed to pay hundreds of billions of dollars
to settle suits pending against it.
6. "Governor Bush Proposes Bold Agenda to Reform America's Civil Justice
System," <http://www.georgewbush.com/news/2OOO/february/prO29OOsc2.asp>.
7. Michiko Kakutani, Shrub: A Texas Style Bashing, NY Times, Feb 18, 2000, at
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initial cost that sets the whole process in motion - the injury to
some poor soul. The injury-related costs including suffering, lost
earnings, ruined lives, family distress, etc. exist regardless of
whether compensation by settlement or jury verdict is provided to
the victim. Thus, the cost issue in product liability law is not
whether costs will be paid, but by whom. Should the costs be
spread over all persons who use a negligently manufactured or designed injury-inflicting product by adding the accident costs to the
price of the product, or must the injured victim bear them alone?
Alternatively, should the American taxpayer shoulder the brunt of
these hard costs in the forms of increased taxes to pay for Medicaid, social security, and disability payments needed to support the
injured person and his or her family? In the end, the need for rational cost spreading and compassion for victims whose human suffering goes uncompensated while those responsible go unpunished
will always turn the tide back toward a more fair legal environment
for products claimants. As important, the products liability laws
will continue to reward manufacturers who design and produce
safe products, and punish those who do not.
II.

TORT REFORM MEASURES

The tort reform movement was borne out of, and nourished

by, a series of perceived crises in the American justice system: the
medical malpractice crisis of the late 1960s, the products liability
crisis of the mid-1970s, and the torts crisis of the 1980s.' The degree to which such crises were real-indeed, whether they were just
fantastically successful public relations ploys by vested interestswill forever be unresolved. 9 These crises were preceded by dra-

8. Joseph A. Page, 78 GEo. L. J. 649, 649-50 (1990) (book review) (reviewing
PETER W. HUBER, DEFORMING TORT LIABILIT: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES)
9. It has been argued that the products liability crises is a myth created by
the insurance industry and product manufacturers. JerryJ. Phillips, Attacks on the
Legal System: Fallacy of Tort Reform Arguments, TRIAL, Feb. 1992, at 106 (trends and
suspected trends in tort liability were blown out of proportion by the insurance
industry to justify its massive rate hikes); Joan Claybrook, ProductsLiability: Serving
All American, TRIAL, Oct. 1990, at 27, 29 (noting that restrictive tort legislation has
not reduced insurance rates). Others argue that there has been no products liability explosion in America. Phillip L. Corboy, Corboy Disputes Quayle's ABA Arguments About Litigation Explosion, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Aug. 30, 1991, at 2 (letter to editor); Ralph Nader &Joan Claybrook, Preservinga Pillarof OurDemocracy: Tort System
Protects the Injured, TRIAL, Dec. 1991, at 45.
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matic rises in insurance premiums. ° The explanation for the sudden rise in premiums-usually supplied by the insurance companies themselves-was that there had been an explosion in case filings and jury awards. There has, however, been little evidence of
such a cataclysm. Even an investigation by the U.S. Congress could
conclude only that state-by-state variations in Rroducts law created
liability uncertainties, not a liability explosion. Nonetheless, those
who faced declining insurance profits as well as those subjected to
higher premium notices, demanded, and often achieved, the passage of state legislation designed to curb the products liability crises
by limiting liability and/or damages.
In the products liability
area, they were successful in getting two major types of legislative
reforms enacted: damages caps and products liability statutes of re13
pose.
A.

Statutes Of Repose

In response to the perceived products liability crisis many
states adopted products liability statutes of repose. 4 As opposed to
a statute of limitations, which cuts off a plaintiffs right to bring suit
after a given period of time after the cause of action accrues, a statute of repose begins to run at the time of manufacture or sale of
the product and may extinguish the cause of action even before it
arises. Most repose statutes set forth an arbitrary number of years
after which suit may not be brought. 5 The statutes create a com10. PATRICIA MUNCH DANZON, CAUSES OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISIS: RISKS AND REGULATION, THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 125-

27 (1978).
11. S. Rep. No. 670, 97h Cong., 2"d Sess., at 3-10 (1982).
12. Page, supra note 8, at 650.
13. The characterization of liability and damages limitations as reforms was a
stroke of public relations genius on the part of those seeking the limitations. It
put the opposition in the position of opposing reform-a concept considered inherently good and progressive. As a matter of perception, those seeking limitation
of tort rights were reformers, while those seeking to uphold individual rights were
defenders of the old, malfunctioning system.
14. Thorton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 425 N.E. 2d 522, 524 (Ill. Ct. App. 1981).
15. The following is at least a partial list of statutes of repose that set forth an
arbitrary number of years after which suit may not be brought: ARiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 12-551 (West 1992) (no action may be commenced if cause of action accrues more than 12 years after product was first sold for use); GA. CODE ANN. § 511-11 (b) (2) (1992) (no action shall be brought after 10 years from date of first sale
for use); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13- 213(b) (West 1992) (no action shall be commenced after 10 years from date of first sale or 12 years from date of first sale to
initial user, whichever period expires earlier); IND. CODE ANN. sec. 34-20-3-1 (West
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plete bar to the injured person's recovery, no matter how negligent
the conduct of the manufacturer and no matter how diligent the
injured person is in seeking legal redress for his injuries.' 6
State products liability statutes of repose have, by and large,
survived enumerable state and federal constitutional challenges
and today severely limit the rights of millions of consumers.17
There is no reason to believe they will be repealed in the near future. On the contrary, the matrix of repose restrictions is being
Supp.1999) (action must be commenced within 10 years after delivery to initial
user); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224(2) (1995) (action must be commenced within 10
years after first sale for use); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) (LEXIS 1999) (no action
shall be brought more than six years after date of initial purchase for use); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02(1) (Michie 1991) (no action may be maintained unless
harm occurred within 10 years after date of initial purchase for use, or within 11
years of date of manufacture of product); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905(1) (1988) (action shall be commenced no later than eight years after first purchase for use).
16. A variation of these statutes-useful life statutes of repose-has been
adopted by a smaller number of states. These statutes are not an absolute bar to
the products liability action, but arbitrarily establish a rebuttable presumption of
the product's useful life. The plaintiff may maintain the suit if she can show that
the product's useful life had not, in fact, expired at the time the injury was sustained.

COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21403(3) (West 1997) ("Ten years after a

product is first sold for use or consumption, it shall be rebuttably presumed that
the product was not defective and that the manufacturer or seller thereof was not
negligent and that all warnings and instructions were proper and adequate.");
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52- 577a(c) (West 1991) (10-year presumption); IDAHO
CODE § 6- 1403(2)
(1998) (10-year presumption); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 603303(b) (1) (Supp.1994) (10-year presumption after time of first delivery); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 411.310(1) (Michie 1992) (presuming product not defective if harm
occurs either more than five years after date of sale to first consumer or more than
eight years after date of manufacture); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.03(1) (West 1988)
(providing for a useful safe life defense "that the injury was sustained following the
expiration of the ordinary useful life of the product"); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.

§7.72.060(2) (West 1992) (12-year presumption after time of first delivery). Useful
life statutes of repose are not as much a new barrier to the products plaintiff as
they are a codification of the useful life defense that has existed in most jurisdictions for many years.
17. E.g., Carr v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 758 F.Supp. 1330, 1333 (D. Ariz. 1991)
(Arizona statute of repose was rationally related to legislature's purpose of controlling perceived products liability crisis and therefore did not violate equal protection); Keleman v. Rimrock, 542 A.2d 720, 725 (Conn. 1988) (holding 10 year statute if repose for products actions does not violate equal protection); Olsen v. J.A.
Freeman Co., 791 P.2d 1285, 1296 (Idaho 1990) (holding statute of repose was not
unconstitutional); Harding v. K.C. Wall Products, Inc., 831 P.2d 958, 963 (Kan.
1992) (holding Kansas statute of repose did not violate either United States of
Kansas Constitution). But see Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g. Co., Inc., 471 A.2d
195, 198 (R.I. 1984) (holding 10 year statute of repose was unconstitutional as
completely denying court access to claimants injured by products more than 10
years old); Lankford v. Sullivan, et al., 416 So. 2d 996, 1004 (Ala. 1982) (holding
repose statute was unconstitutional).
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expanded both by new, more specific state statutes and by federal
repose statues. Both of these developments, and their interplay, is
illustrated by the infamous Payne Stewart Learjet crash that occurred in October 1999. Just 24 days before the Stewart crash, Florida enacted a statute exempting commercial airplanes that are
more then twenty years old from products liability claims. 1 This
statute19 combines with 1994's federal General Aviation Revitaliza20

tion Act, which provides an 18 year statute of repose for aircraft
that seat fewer than 20 passengers, to ensure that the families of
the victims of that crash will have no legal recourse, even if it turns
out that the manufacturer's negligence caused the crash:.2 The future will probably bring even more federal repose statutes, because,
despite the severity of such statutes, Congress continues to debate
adding more limitations. For example, in June 1999 a bill calling
for an 18 year statute of repose for workplace products was introduced in the United States House of Representatives. 22 It would
bar employees covered by worker's compensation from maintaining
suit against a product manufacturer if the injury-causing product
was more than 18 years old. However, management, third-parties
and others not covered by workers compensation could still sue.
The bill made it out of the House Judiciary Committee but was not
23
voted on by the full House. Support for it, and bills like it, remains strong, however, and, depending on the outcome of the
2000 presidential and congressional elections, may be enacted into
law in the next few years.
B.

Damages Caps

In the last twenty-five years, numerous states have adopted
statutes limiting the amount of damages that can be recovered by
injured plaintiffs. These caps, which apply regardless of the
amount of damages assessed by the jury, come in many sizes. Some
limit only the non-economic damages (pain, suffering, etc.)
18. Kristen Loiacono, Statutes of Repose: Laws that Come back to Haunt, TRAL,
Feb. 2000, at 11.
19. FLA. STAT. ch. 95.03(2) (b) (1) (2000).
20. 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-40120 (1994). The repose period in the federal General Aviation Revitalization Act has been held to preempt state actions brought after the period has expired. See also Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 93
Cal. Rptr. 2d 124, 132 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
21. Loiacono, supra note 18.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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awarded by the jury. Others limit all damages, including economic
(lost wages, medical bills, etc.) damages. While many caps, especially those that attempted to limit economic dama es, have been
ruled violative of the particular state's constitution, there remain
caps on non-economic damages, applicable to products liability actions, in over 15 states. 25
The future will bring continued constitutional challenges to
these caps, especially by the constitutional litigation team established by the Legal Affairs Department of the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America.26 Challenges have been successful. In 1999,
Oregon's $500,000 cap on non-economic damages was struck down
when the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that it violated the right to
jury guaranteed by the Oregon Constitution. 2' However, within a
few days of the Court's decision, the Oregon legislature referred a
measure to the May 2000 ballot that would amend the Constitution
to include the $500,000 cap on damages in all civil actions. 28 On
May 16, 2000, in the nation's first vote-by-mail primary, Oregon
voters
. 29 overwhelmingly rejected the Amendment by a 3-to-1 margin. by Thus, the ultimate future of these types of caps may be decided at the polls, regardless of the opinions of the appellate
courts. To the extent that these caps are upheld as constitutional,

24. Smith v. Schulte, 671 So. 2d 1334, 1344 (Ala. 1995) (holding that a damage cap violated the equal protection and jury trial provisions of the Alabama constitution); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 833-39 (N.H. 1980) (holding, under a
test more stringent than rational basis, that a damage cap violates the equal protection provision of the New Hampshire constitution); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d
765, 770-72 (Ohio 1991) (holding that a damage cap violates the due process provision, but not the equal protection provision, of the Ohio constitution); Knowles
v. United States, 544 N.W.2d 183, 191 (S.D. 1996) (holding that a damage cap violated the due process provision of the South Dakota constitution). See also Smith v.
Dep't. of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1087-89 (Fla. 1987) (holding that statutory cap violates access to the courts provision of Florida constitution); Best v. Taylor Mach.
Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1078 (Ill. 1997) (holding that statutory cap violates special legislation and separation of powers provisions of Illinois constitution); Lucas
v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 690-92 (Tex. 1988) (holding that statutory cap
violates access to the courts provision of Texas constitution).
25. Haig & Caley, Successfully Defending Products Liability Cases, 5 FED. LITIG.
GUIDE RPTR. 693, 695 (Nov. 1995).
26. Jean Hellwege, Constitutional Litigation Team Battles Tort Reform, TRIAL,
April 2000, at 16.
27. Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 463-64 (Or. 1999).
28. Jean Hellwege, Oregon, Indiana Courts Weigh in on Side of Consumes in Tort
Reform Cases, TRIAL, Sept. 1999, at 14.

29. "OregonVoters Reject Tort "Reform" Initiative that Would Have Limited
Rights,"http://www.wstla.org/legagenda.asp (Visited September 9, 2000).
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or adopted in the form of constitutional amendments, they will
make it impossible for future plaintiffs to recover the full costs imposed upon them in the form of a product inflicted injury.
C. Federal Tort Reform

The future of tort reform lies in the federalization of products
liability laws. As inevitable as the return of swallows, each session of
Congress sees attempts at legislative tort reform. In 1996, the socalled Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act," which
contained sweeping preemption of state products liability law, was
actually passed by Congress, but was vetoed by President Clinton.
Similar bills were introduced in Congress in 1997 and 1998, but
died there.

Currently, the Small Business Liability Reform Act,3 ' is

making its way through committee. Although billed as a protection
for small businesses, the Act's draconian liability and damages limitations will be applicable to very large, very profitable businesses.
Since the Act includes all unincorporated business in its definition
of small business, privately held businesses-even behemoth
ones-would be protected by its provisions regardless of their size.
Further, the Act defines small business as any business that has
fewer than 25 employees, regardless of the business annual reve32
nues or sales. Thus, companies having fewer than 25 employees,
regardless of the number of products they put in the stream of
commerce, and regardless of the amount of harm their products
potentially may inflict upon consumers, would be protected by the
bill. The bill also has provisions that protect product retailers regardless of their size.33
The bill's protections are sweeping. With few exceptions, the
bill would apply to every civil suit brought against these small businesses.34 The Act would severely limit retailer liability both in the
context and by undermining state law on
strict products liability
• 35
implied warranties. It would cap punitive damages at three times
the compensatory damages or $250,000, whichever is less, and it

30.

E.g., The Products Liability Reform Act, S. REP. No. 648, 105th Cong.

(1997).
31.

H.R. 2366, 106"' Cong. (2000).

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at Title 1,102 (10)(A).
Id. at Title I.
Id. at Title I, 103-104.
Id. at Title II, 204(a) (1).
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would all but destroy joint and several liability.36 Should it be
passed this year, it would almost certainly be vetoed by President
Clinton. However, should George W. Bush become president, such
legislation, or perhaps even more sweeping products legislation,
has a good chance of being enacted into law in the next few years.7
In any event, the future promises continued debate in Congress,
and an ever-present threat that Congress will act to curtail plaintiffs
state law rights.
III. THE FUTURE OF OTHER SUBSTANTIATIVE LAW LIMITATIONS ON
PRODUCTS LIABILITY SUITS

A. FederalPreemption Of ProductsLiability Causes Of Action

In many disparate areas of law, courts are finding that the provisions for compensation found in state common law are simply a
nullity-preempted by federal regulatory regimes. Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, federal 1 8legislation can nullify conflicting state and local causes of action. Congressional intent is the ultimate touchstone of whether preemption
39
40
exists, 9 but preemption may be implied by the legislative scheme.
Courts will not preempt state law absent an unambiguous Congressional mandate to that effect.4 ' This presumption against preemp-

36. Id. at Title I, 103(b).
37. In an effort to avoid this possibility, plaintiffs' trial lawyers are donating
huge sums of money to the Democratic party to defeat Bush. Trial Lawyers Pour
Money Into Democrats Chests N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2000, at 1.
38. Article IV of the Constitution provides that federal law has priority over
state and local laws. This permits Congress to enact laws of national applicability
even if they contravene state statutes. Id. See also Ministry of Health of Ont. v.
Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1431 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
39. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (quoting Retail
Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)); California Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987).
40. There are two species of preemption: express and implied. Ministry of
Health of Ont., 858 F. Supp. at 1431. "Express preemption requires that Congres
state affirmatively its intention to preempt or supercede state law." Id. Implied
preemption exists where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room' for supplementary state regulation. Id. at 1431-32 (quoting Hillsboro County v. Automated
Med. Lab., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)). The Supreme Court ruling in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 504 (1992) infers, without establishing a rule, that
an express preemption clause in federal legislation forecloses implied preemption.
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287-88 (1995).
41. Fla. Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963).
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tion was formerly nearly insurmountable when finding preemption
42
left an injured person without a remedy. Beginning in the late
eighties, however, courts began expanding the instances in which
common law remedies are preempted. Additional Congressional
action in the future may increase this trend.
A great battle over the issue of whether product liability claims
are preempted is currently being fought in the area of medical devices. In response to mounting consumer injuries caused by devices used to treat health conditions,43 Congress passed the Medical
Device Amendments of 1976 (AMDA) .4 The MDA brought medical devices under the province of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
and, for the first time, brought regulation by the Food and Drug
Administration (AFDA). At first, courts held that the MDA didn't
preempt state tort law45 or found limited preemption where the
FDA had promulgated specific regulations applicable to the device
at issue. 46 That all changed in 1992, when the Supreme Court decideciInc.4 7 influenced preemption
sion in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
49
48
Corp.
sions in King v. Collagen Corp. and Stamps v. Collagen
In King and Stamps, which involved injuries caused by a treatment for facial wrinkles made from bovine tissue, the First and
Fifth Circuits held that since the product had passed the premarket FDA approval process, state law causes of action were preempted. The First Circuit was concerned that allowing strict liability would force the court to determine the product was not safe in
contradiction of the FDA. 5' The Fifth Circuit was concerned that
applying Texas tort law would constitute a requirement either different from, or in addition to, a requirement...that the MDA has
made applicable to the product. 5' Three years later, the Ninth Cir42. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251-52 (1984).
43. Gail H. Javit, I've Got You UnderMy Skin-And I Can't Get Redress:An Analysis
of Recent Case Law AddressingPreemption of ManufacturerLiability for Class III Medical
Devices, 49 FOoD & DRUG L.J. 553, 558 (1994).
44. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. ' 55, 42
U.S.C. 3512, and in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (1994)).
45. Calan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F.Supp. 662, 662 (D. Md. 1989).
46. E.g., Moore v. Kimberly-Clarke Corp., 687 F.2d 243, 243 (5,' Cir. 1989).
47. 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (plurality opinion). In Cipollone, a smoker made
claims of design defect, failure to warn, warranty and fraud against the three cigarette manufacturers. A plurality of the Court ruled that portions of two of her five
claims were preempted. Id. at 505-6.
48. 983 F.2d 1130 (1' Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 824 (1993).
49. 984 F.2d 1416 (5"' Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 824 (1993).
50. King, 983 F.2d at 1135.
51. Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1421.
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cuit created a split among the Circuits by ruling that tort law causes
51
of action are not preempted by the MDA.
Hopes that the United States Supreme Court would clarify this
law were dashed in the hopelessly divided decision Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr.53 Lohr ruled that the MDA did not preempt all state tort actions against a pacemaker manufacturer, where the approval
granted to the manufacturer was not based upon a finding of safety
and effectiveness. The decision was a contradictory plurality: four
Justices opined that few, if any common law claims are preempted; 54 four partially dissenting Justices voted for substantial
preemption and the swing Justice stated that the MDA will sometimes preempt a state-law tort suit.55 Post-Lohr, the courts remain
split, with some deciding that plaintiffs harmed by medical devices
simply cannot sue for damages.
In addition, the Court's earlier ruling in Freightlinerv Myrick57
made it easier for courts to find implied preemption. Thus, preemption is regularly injected as a defense almost any case involving
a product that has arguably been subject to federal regulation.
Even when unsuccessful, the defense, and the motions that it
spawns, has made products liability cases more expensive for plaintiffs and their counsel. Worse for plaintiffs, however, is that the
preemption defense is often successful. The last decade has seen
federal legislation employed to preempt a wide variety of products
claims. As discussed above, federal statutes of repose, such as the
repose period found in the General Aviation Revitalization Act, 58
preempt state actions brought after the period has expired. 5' That
Act has also been held to preempt all failure to warn claims by aircraft passengers against the plane's manufacturer, regardless of
when brought. The Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 has been

52. Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1453 (9" Cir. 1995).
53. 518 U.S. 470, 474 (1996). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's ruling
in Lohr, and its limitations, see Kenneth T. Sigman, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr: Bad
Medicinefor Manufacturersof Medical Devices, 47 CATH. U.L. REv. 721, 721 (1998).
54. 518 U.S. 470, 488492 (1996).
55. Id. at 503.
56. Mitchell v. Collagen Corp, 126 F.3d 902, 915 (7th Cir. 1997) and Oja v.
Howmedica, 111 F.3d 782, 792 (10" Cir. 1997) (finding preemption). But see
Goodlin v. Medtronic, 167 F.3d 1367, 1367 (11 Cir. 1999) (holding that even premarket approval does not create preemption).
57. 514 U.S. 280, 280 (1995); Hellwege, supra note 28.
58. 49 U.S.C. § 40101, et seq.(2000).
59. Supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
60. Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 124, 133-34 (Cal.
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held by a majority of courts to preempt actions by boaters and
swimmers injured or killed by inadequately guarded propellers of
outboard boat motors.62 The Federal Boiler Inspection Act 3 has
been held to preempt claims against locomotive manufacturers for
asbestos exposure by railroad workers exposed to asbestos used in
locomotives. 64 The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act6 is regularly held to preempt actions against pesticide manufacturers, and has even preempted a failure to warn claim against
the manufacturer of pool chlorine tablets. 67 The Federal Meat Inspection Act 6s has preempted claims alleging that plaintiffs' children became seriously ill as a result eating meat contaminated with
of E. coli. bacteria. 69 And the MDA continues to be advanced as a
defense with success. Recently, for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a failure to warn claim against the manufacturer of a blood screening test by a patient who received HIV infected blood was preempted by the MDA.70
Against this backdrop of judicial willingness to preempt state
products law and leave victims with no legal recourse, Congress
continues to enact legislation specifically designed to preempt state
products liability law. For example, the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998 7' and the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program 72 restrict common law remedies. The former is intended to alleviate a critical shortage of biomaterials for
use in medical device implants by protecting suppliers from law-

Ct. App. 2000).
61. 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311(2000).
62. Amy. P. Chiang, Note, The FederalBoat Safety Act of 1971 and PropellerStrike
Injuries: an Unexpected Exercise in Federal Preemption, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 487, 492
(1999). See also supracases cited in note 24 (reporting that ten of twelve courts to
consider the issue have upheld preemption defenses based on the Act).
63. 49 U.S.C. § 20701, et. seq.(2000).
64. Scheiding v. Gen. Motors Corp., 993 P.2d 996, 996 (Cal. 2000).
65. 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-136 (2000).
66. See, e.g., Andrus v. Agrevo USA Co., 178 F.3d 395, 400 (5" Cir. 1999); Nat'l
Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 602 (8"' Cir. 1999); Shaw v.
Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 364 (7h Cir. 1993); Arkansas-Platte & Gulf P'ship
v. Van Waters & Rodgers, 981 F.2d 1177, 1177 (10" Cir. 1993).
67. Hawkins v. Leslie's Pool Mart, Inc., 184 F.3d 244, 244 (3 d Cir. 1999).
68. 21 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.(2000).
69. Boulahanis v. Prevo's Family Mkt., Inc., 583 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Mich. App.
Ct. 1998).
70. R.F. v. Abbott Labs., 745 A.2d 1174, 1206 (N.J. 2000).
71. 21 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. (2000)
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 - 300aa-34 (2000).
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The latter supplants state law remedies with a federal legislative compensation system for children injured or killed by vacon recovery is a wrongful death
cines. Among its many limitations
14
award limit of $250,00.
Most likely, the future will find the passage of more preemptory legislation, and continued judicial decisions allowing legislation-both expressly and impliedly-to leave
injured plaintiffs without a remedy.
B.

The Reasonable AlternativeDesign Requirement Of The Restatement
(Third) Of Torts: ProductsLiability

Over thirty five years ago, the American Law Institute (ALI) issued the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second), drafted by William Prosser, adopted strict products
liability, stating that a seller of any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user is subject to liability. 5 In the
subsequent thirty five years, courts throughout America have
adopted the reasoning of 402A while developing guidelines for the
determination of when a product is in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user. Now, the ALI has issued The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, and has sparked great
controversy by revising the strict liability section in a way that will
restrict plaintiffs' ability to recover for injuries caused by defectively
designed products. 76
Three major types of defects have emerged over the years as
the bases for strict products liability actions: manufacturing defects,
design defects and defect by reason of inadequate warning or instruction. The Restatement (Third) makes no dramatic changes regarding manufacturing or failure to warn defects. Its impact will be
in the area of design defects. Section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third)
requires that a plaintiff prove the existence of a reasonable alternative design in order to prove defective design:
A product... (b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
73.
74.
75.

Frumer & Freidman, ProductsLiability, § 53.03[2] (MB, 1999).
42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-15(a) (2) (2000).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 402A (1965).

76. There is widespread suspicion that the Restatement (Third) is not as much a
restatement of the law as an instrument of tort reform. Andrew F. Popper, Tort
Reform Policy More Than State Law Dominates Section 2 of The Restatement (Third), 8
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 38, 38 (Fall 1998); Larry S. Stewart, The Al and ProductsLi-

ability: Restatement or Reform?, TRIAL, Sept. 1994, at 28, 30-31.
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reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a
predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and
the omission of the alternative design renders the product
not reasonably safe."
The development of the law of design defect has led to two
major competin theories-the risk/utility test and the consumer
expectation test. Under the consumer expectation test a product
is deemed defective if it fails to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect.7 9 The authors of the Restatement (Third),
Profs. Henderson and Twerski, reject the consumer expectation
test, describing it as "so open ended and unstructured that it provides almost no guidance to the jury" and "leave[s] manufacturers
uncertain of the law's demands.
The Restatement (Third)'s § 2(b)
revision, therefore, amplifies the risk/utility standard, which has
been described as "vary[ing] with the surrounding circumstances
and.. .involv[ing] a 'balancing of the likelihood of harm, and the
gravity of harm if it happens, against the burden of the precaution
which would be effective to avoid the harm'."8'
Unfortunately for many future products plaintiffs, the Restatement (Third) takes a rigid approach to the utility/risk concept. Although the risk/utility test incorporates many different factors in
different states, and alternative design is among those factors in
many states, 82 it is not a mandatory requirement in the majority of
states. 83 With limited exceptions, the Restatement (Third) makes it a
mandatory requirement, collapsing the intricate and varied
risk/utility test into a single factor: Was there a reasonable and
safer alternative design at the time of the manufacture of the product? This is not a restatement of a generally agreed upon legal
rule, but a narrowing of the law of most states. More importantly, it
imposes an unfair burden of evidentiary production on injured
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODuCTs LIABILIn § 2(b) (1998).
78. While generally fitting the rubrics risk/utility and consumer expectations,
there are many variations of design defect law across the fifty states and no true
consensus on what design defect means. Popper, supra note 74, at 40.
79. Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 305-06 (Cal. 1994).
80. James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512, 1534 (1992).
81. Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Minn. 1984) (quoting Holm v.
Sponco Mfg., 324 N.W.2d 207, 212 (Minn. 1982)).
82. Popper, supra note 75, at 40.
83. Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1331-32 n.11
(Conn. 1997).
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consumers and shifts the focus of any product liability lawsuit from
reality-what happened to the product?-to speculation-what
other similar products could feasibly have been designed?
Comment f to § 2 of the Restatement (Third) states that a plaintiff does not actually have to produce a prototype of the alternatively designed product.14 Presumably, therefore, a plaintiff will introduce expert testimony about a design envisioned by that expert,
but not actually in existence. The comment suggests topics for the
plaintiffs expert testimony:
the instructions and warnings which might accompany the
envisioned design;
how the alternative design will satisfy consumer expectations;
the cost of producing the alternative design;
the effect of the alternative design on product function;
the effect of the alternative design on product longevity;
the aesthetics of the proposed design; and
85
the marketability of the alternative design .
Comment f insists that the plaintiff may not need to prove all
these factors, and even suggests that in certain simple cases.reason86
able alternative design can be shown without expert testimony. In
the real world, however, most cases involve complex products, and
proof of most of these factors will have to be adduced in order for
plaintiff to meet the burden of showing an alternative design. The
plaintiff will have to become an expert in the technology that
caused the plaintiffs injury, and will need to re-design the product
himself."' To the extent that this can even be done, it will make
products cases more, and possibly prohibitively, expensive and
plunge every trial into the realm of speculation about hypothetical
881
design features.
Some argue that in many instances the new Restatement does
not require the production of an alternative design .'9 The excep84.

TORTS RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODucTs LIABILITY

§ 2 cmt. f

(1998).
85. Id.
86.
87.

Id.
Popper, supranote 75, at 40-41.

Michael V. Ciresi & Gary L. Wilson, A Misstatement of Minnesota Products
88.
Liability Law: Why Minnesota Should Reject the Requirement That a PlaintiffProve a Reasonable AlternativeDesign, 21 WM. MITCHELL. L. REv. 369, 375-78 (1995).

89.

Popper, supra note 75, at 40.
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tion-that where a product has "low social utility and a high degree
of danger," alternative design may not need to be shown-is not in
the text, but buried in comment e. 90 The illustration it employsan exploding cigar-is laughable and underscores how low the utility and high the degree of danger must be to trigger the excep-

tion.91
The alternative design requirement of the Restatement (Third)
has been so widely criticized that it may be ignored by most
courts.93 If, however, the coming years find courts adopting its inflexible alternative design requirement, the future will burden
plaintiffs with the difficult and expensive task of designing better
products than a defendant's corporate engineers could envision.
Even more daunting is the possibility that recent developments in
the evidentiary law of expert opinion may combine with the Restatement (Third)'s alternative design requirement to simply make
products liability cases unprovable.
C. Daubert, The ReasonableAlternativeDesign Requirement Of The
Restatement (Third) And The End Of ProductsLiability
In federal court, the admissibility of expert testimony is governed by the Supreme Court's decisions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc.94 Daubert requires that scientific evidence be not only
relevant, but reliable. 95 An expert's testimony must be based on
scientific knowledge and "connotes more than subjective belief or
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUcTS LIABILITY, § 2 cmt. e (1998).
91. Id. at § 2 cmt. e, illus. 5.
92. E.g., Popper, supra note 75, at 40-41 and articles cited therein at footnotes
8-15, 17-19; Jerry R. Palmer, GeneralDiscussion of the Restatement (Third). 8 KAN.J.L.
& PUB. POL' 35 (Fall 1998); Ciresi & Wilson, supra note 87, at 370.
93. The Connecticut Supreme Court specifically rejected the alternative reasonable design requirement of § 2(b), stating that it imposed an undue burden on
plaintiffs that might preclude otherwise valid claims form jury consideration. Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1331 (Conn. 1997). However,
the Ninth Circuit, while not adopting the Restatement (Third), did comment that "it
provid[ed] support for our holding that a focus on the design's benefits, risks, and
feasible alternatives is a better approach to examining an alleged design defect
[than the consumer expectations approach]." Saratoga Fishing Co. v. Marco Seattle, Inc., 69 F.3d 1432, 1441 (9o' Cir. 1995). While no Arizona case has adopted
the Restatement (Third), Arizona has demonstrated a willingness to look to the Restatement (Third) as the current statement of the law. Gebhardt v. Mentor Corp.,
191 F.R.D. 180,185 (D.C. Ariz. 1999).
94. 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993).
95. Id. at 589. The Daubert standards were extended to experienced based
expert testimony in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,526 U.S. 137, 137-38 (1999).
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,96

unsupported speculation.
Federal judges, and an increasing
number of state judges, 97 now have much greater discretion to decide both how to test an expert's reliability... and whether that expert's relevant testimony is reliable.98 As a result, plaintiffs in products liability cases almost inevitably face Daubert motions to exclude
all or part of the expert testimony they plan to introduce to support
their claims. Losing such a motion is devastating to the plaintiffs
case, but even when the plaintiff prevails, an additional, and often
expensive layer of motion practice, including a very expensive
Daubert hearing, 99 is added to the case.
Moreover, if future courts adopt the requirements of Daubert
and the alternative design requirement of Section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third), it may make it impossible for plaintiffs to prove
some products liability cases. Manufacturers will want it both ways,
insisting that plaintiffs prove reasonable alternative design and
then asserting that the scientific opinion supporting the hypothetical is not admissible. Such was the case in Stanczyk v. Black &
Decker, Inc)00 where the court applied its view of the Daubert requirements to an expert's testimony about a hypothetical alternative design. In Stanczyk, plaintiffs expert, an engineer who formerly
worked for the defendant, testified that a design was possible that
tightened the gap in a miter saw through which the plaintiffs hand
had slipped onto the blade.'
The expert testified that he had
done enough engineering analysis to determine that the design was
feasible, but that construction of an actual prototype would require
several hundred hours of engineering work.'0 2 The court found
that Daubert required the production of a testable design and ruled

96.

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.

97. Many state courts have adopted at least some of the requirements of
Daubert. E.g. Turner v. State, 746 So. 2d 355, 358 (Ala. 1998); State v. Porter, 698
A.2d 739, 739 (Conn. 1997); State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1121-22 (La. 1993).
98. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152.
99. "The purpose of a Daubert hearing is to determine 'the scientific validity
and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability-of the principles that underlie a
proposed submission." Greenwell v. Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492, 497 (6 h Cir. 1999)
(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95). Depending on the complexity of the scientific evidence to be presented, Daubert hearings can take several days and be very
expensive to plaintiffs and their attorneys. Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184
F.3d 1300, 1304 (11' Cir. 1999) (noting that the trial court held a three day
Dauberthearing and then ruled the evidence inadmissible).
100. 836 F. Supp. 565, 566 (N.D. Ill. 1993).

101.
102.

Id.
Id. at 567.
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the expert's testimony inadmissible.
adopted by some other courts. 104

103

This reasoning has been

With good reason, the Stanczyk decision makes [plaintiff attorney's] hair stand on end. °5 Widespread adoption of this reasoning
would nullify the ALI's position that Section 2(b) of the Restatement
(Third) does not require the plaintiff to actually produce a prototype.106 The combination of Stanczyk's requirement that an alternative design be proved by introduction of a working prototype with
the Restatement Third's' 2(b) requirement that a reasonable alternative design must be shown to prove a design defect would make design defect cases prohibitively expensive and, in most cases, unmaintainable. Only time will tell if the synergy between these two
developments does what tort reformers have been trying to do legislatively for thirty years - kill products liability litigation. A good
prediction is that it will not. Most judges won't allow the unintended consequences of these two separate developments to have
such a serious effect on all products liability law, and leave injured
persons without recourse.
IV. MULTI-DISTRICT LITIGATION: THE MDL BAR AND ITS EFFECT
ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY PLAINTIFFS
When the American public is exposed to a harmful, mass-

produced product, the result can be thousands of similar injuries.
Subsequently, there are many similar lawsuits. Over the last thirty
years, the judicial system has struggled to deal with these numerous
claims-particularly in the asbestos, drug and medical device contexts. 107 One mechanism for handling these cases has been the de103. Id. The Stanczyk court went on to find a peer review requirement in
Daubert, and rule that under such a requirement, all alternative designs except
those used in industry practice were inadmissable. Id. at 565, 567.
104. E.g., Buckman v. Bombardier Corp., 893 F. Supp. 547, 557 (E.D.N.C.
1995) (Using the reasoning of Stanczyk, expert testimony of alternative design excluded where he produced photographs of product attachment, but did no testing
of design in practice); Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 462 S.E.2d 321, 330 (S.C. Ct. App.
1995) (citing Stanczyk and holding that plaintiff failed to introduced evidence of
alternative design where expert introduced non-working demonstrative model of
redesigned device); see also Mistich v. Volkswagen of Germany, Inc., 650 So. 2d
385, 391 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (relying on Stanczyk to exclude testimony, including
that of reasonable alternative design, by plaintiffs expert), reh'g denied (La. Mar.
14, 1995).
105. Palmer, supra note 91, at 36.
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 2 cmt. f (1998).
107. Of course, individualized treatment of some class of claims is almost im-
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velopment of Multidistrict Litigation (AMDL).
The venue provision of 28 U.S.C. Section 1407 authorizes
temporary transfer of litigation pending in multiple federal district
courts to a single district court for coordinated pretrial proceedings. Once the pretrial MDL administration is complete, the indi-°8
vidual cases are remanded and each moves toward its own trial.1
The •principles109governing Section 1407 are convenience and judicial economy.
These principles are theoretically served by pretrial consolidation, but the rise of an institutional MDL bar and bureaucracy has created controversy. Rather than solving problems,
the MDL often becomes a black hole from which cases, plaintiffs
and defendants cannot escape. Often, the ultimate resolution of
the litigation seems based more on judicial and administrative convenience than on a fair consideration of liability or compensation
to victims. In fact, these factors often conspire to wrest control of
the lawsuit away from the individual plaintiff and his chosen attorney and vest it in a plaintiffs' steering committee that may lack incentive to always pursue any individual plaintiffs best interests. A
basic history of the MDL mass tort litigation of the past decade
helps shed some light on these controversies, and may foreshadow
changes in the future.
A.

The Rise Of MDL Mass Tort Litigation In The 1990s

The consolidation of mass tort cases using the MDL process
resulted in the forced union of plaintiffs attorneys with very distinct
possible. For example, with regard to the asbestos litigation, the Supreme Court
stated:
[t]he most objectionable aspects of asbestos litigation can be briefly
summarized: dockets in both federal and state courts continue to grow;
long delays are routine; trials are too long; the same issues are litigated
over and over; transaction costs exceed victim's recovery by nearly two to
one; exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the process; and future
claimants may lose all together.
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997).
108. For many years it became the practice for many MDLjudges to transfer
the MDL cases to themselves for trial. John F. Nangle, From the Horse's Mouth: The
Workings of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 341, 344
(1999). Frequently, the MDL became like a black hole-once a case entered it, it
never escaped. However, in Lexecon, Inc. v. Millberg, Weiss Bershad Hynes and Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998), the Supreme Court ruled that an MDL court had no authority to assign a transferred case to itself, and must remand it to the original
court for trial. Legislation is currently pending that would overrule Lexecon.
109. Trudy Y. Hartzog & Wade H. Logan III, The Nuts and Bolts of Multidistrict
Litigation,8 S.C. LAWYER 20, 20 (Aug. 1996).
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philosophies, practices and economic incentives. For the sake of
discussion, the practices will be divided into three separate camps:
class action attorneys, traditional case personal injury attorneys,
and volume attorneys. In any given piece of litigation, these distinctions may be blurred, with an individual attorney falling in any
one-or more than one-of the camps.
1.

The Class Action Attorneys

Many class action lawyers first cut their teeth doing class action
securities and/or antitrust litigation in the 1980s. In the federal
courts, class actions are governed by Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23. Rule 23
states that one or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties
on behalf of all provided certain prerequisite
• 110
conditions exist.
The prerequisites are 1) the class is so numerousjoinder of all members is impractical; 2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class; 3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the class; and 4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class."' Thus, class action practitioners only need one client to
serve as a class representative in order to file a class action lawsuit.
Securities litigation lent itself to class action treatment. Usually, the violation complained of affected all shareholders equally
and the loss was easily measured: the diminution of value on a certain share times the total number of shares. While per share losses
may have been modest, the total loss could be huge.
Of course, the key to making the cases economical for the
plaintiffs' lawyers was class certification under Fed. R. Evid. 23.
Once certified, the economics of the cases made sense: relatively
few clients (hence, low per case transactions costs), common liability and legal issues, and large, easily measured damages. Absent
certification, only the largest shareholders would have incurred
enough total damage to economically justify pursuing the cases individually. While a class action attorney may have a fee agreement
with the classtherepresentative,
the class action attorney must petition
ourtfor112
the court for fees from the absent class members. 1 Moreover, no
fee can be requested absent a recovery on behalf of the class. 113
110.
111.
112.
(3d ed.
113.

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), which is entitled "Prerequisites to a Class Action."
Id.
2 HERBERT B. NEWBERG& ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLAss ACTIONS, § 6.09
1992).
3 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 111, at § 14.02. As Newberg states, class
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Typically, a fee petition would be made against the total fund recovered based on the time expended increased by a lodestar multiplier.'14 As a result, absent class members would receive a check
based on the number of the shares they owned, and the class action
attorneys often received a large recovery based
1 5 on the result obtained, the risk involved and the hours worked.'
The class action lawyers were quite successful, but eventually
the number of class action lawyers increased and the number of viable securities/antitrust cases decreased. As a result, some of the
class action practitioners turned their attention and resources to
the mass tort setting, focusing on the burgeoning MDL practice.
2.

The TraditionalIndividual Case Practitioner

Once in the mass tort setting, the something for everyone philosophy of the class action attorneys ran headlong into the traditional personal injury philosophy. Even among the traditional
practitioners, their was a split between the traditional trial lawyer
who carefully screened cases and the volume attorneys, who would
basically take all claimants regardless of the seriousness of the individual's injury.
The traditional mass tort/product liability attorney carefully
screened each case and individually represented only those clients
with the most severe injuries. The assumption underlying this philosophy was that each case may need to go to trial, and each case
had to make economic sense on its own merits. The cases were
done on a contingent fee basis, and if the potential recovery would
not cover the costs and time expended, the cases would not make
economic sense.
As with the class action cases, the traditionalists hoped to eventually settle all their cases. The strategy was to move the best cases
forward first, conduct the discovery against the defendant, and try
or settle the best cases. If this strategy was successful, the defendant
would then face a number of similar cases using the same liability
counsel may not charge absent fee members for reimbursement of litigation costs
or attorneys fees if the class is unsuccessful. Id. If the attorneys recover a fund for
the benefit of the class, a fee petition can be filed for reimbursement of reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees. Id.
114. Id. at § 14.03. The lodestar multiplier can lead to a fee calculation that
essentially leads to a recovery of a percentage of the recovered fund. Id. Factors
weighed by the courts in calculating class counsel's attorneys fee include risk involved, performance of counsel and benefits to the class. Id.
115. Id.
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evidence for a successive number of seriously injured plaintiffs represented by the same plaintiffs' attorney. The approach contained
inherent efficiencies, because the liability was basically the same in
each case, with individual damages differing based on the circumstances of each client. The traditional practitioner hoped that,
eventually, the defendant would settle his or her entire inventory of
cases. These attorneys all expected to be compensated, if successful, from the contingent fees generated from their own clients'
cases. Thus, the traditionalists sought the maximum recovery for
each client, an arrangement that served the interests of both the
attorney and the individual clients.
When faced with an MDL consolidation, the traditionalists
would cooperate with each other in conducting discovery, understanding that each would benefit by splitting both the cost and
work needed to complete discovery. Moreover, if they all pitched
in, presumable the final case put together would also be better,
which would increase the recovery both they and their clients received.
3.

The Mass Marketing,High Volume Attorneys

As attorney advertising became more accepted, a third group
arose, the mass marketing, high volume attorneys. These attorneys
often advertised for clients and basically took all clients, the good,
the bad and the in-between. These attorneys were somewhat of a
hybrid between the class action attorneys and the traditional attorneys. Like the traditional attorneys, they were compensated directly by their clients on a contingent fee basis. They also had an
incentive to settle all of the cases if possible. However, unlike the
traditional attorneys, they may not have enough serious cases to justify trying a number of cases. Also, because of the high number of
cases, they could not afford to provide the extensive discovery to
the defendants for each individual case.
Economically, the incentive was to handle a large number of
cases as cheaply as possible, and hope for a large global settlement
in which all claimants, even those not seriously injured, would receive some compensation. Clearly, a global resolution of all claims
benefitted the volume attorneys. In this sense, the volume attorneys economic interests could align with the class action attorneys,
who pushed for and often obtained a global resolution of all
claims, including the claims of the absent class members. On the
other hand, like the traditionalists, the volume attorneys also would
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000
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benefit by achieving as a high a recovery as possible for each client.
B.

Disputes Among Plaintiffs' Lawyers In The Multidistrict Litigation
Setting

Not surprisingly, when these three groups were thrown together in the MDL process, disputes soon arose, especially over
compensation. As Newberg points out in his section on mass torts,
when there is a class action, the potential plaintiffs counsel is faced
with the choice of either participating in the class action or being
substantially preempted
and, .consequently,
collecting
only a sub.
.
116
stantially reduced fee from his or her client.
The incentive for
class counsel is just the opposite: they can represent all similarly
situated persons in the mass tort with the potential for a greatly enhanced recovery for the class and a similarly enhanced fee."'
The battleground initially centered on appointments to the
Plaintiffs' Steering Committee (PSC) "" posts. Since the PSC spoke
for the plaintiffs before the court, and controlled the manner in
which discovery and major issues (including settlement) would be
handled, spots on the committee were greatly prized. Often, the
negotiating and bargaining that went on behind the scenes concerning the appointments resembled Washington-styled lobbying.
Unfortunately, once the appointments were made, the disputes did
not end. Predictably, given the divergent economic interests of the
various plaintiffs' attorneys, the internal disputes ultimately taken
to the MDLjudge for resolution centered on attorneys' fees.

116.

Id. at § 17.01.
117. Id. Although Newberg does not discuss the reasons for this, it is clear that
class counsel benefits by getting a higher total recovery for everyone, even if this is
at the risk of undercompensating the most seriously injured. Id.
118. As Herr pointed out in his treatise, Multidistrict Litigation, the Multidistrict Panel has recognized the benefits of having lead and liaison counsel. DAVID F.
HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION: HANDLING CASES BEFORE THE JUDICIAL PANEL ON
MULTIDISTRIcr LITIGATION § 9.7.7. Thus, although not required, most MDLjudges

appoint lead counsel for the parties. Id. Where the litigation is large and there
are numerous plaintiffs, the MDLjudges will pick several of the plaintiffs' lawyers
to act as a Plaintiffs Steering Committee. In re Thirteen Appeals Arising Out of the
San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 56 F.3d 295, 300 (1" Cir. 1995). The
purpose of the PSC is to look "after the big picture: mapping the overarching discovery, trial and settlement strategies and coordinating the implementation of
those strategies." Id. (quoting In re Nineteen Appeals, 982 F.2d 603, 605 (1" Cir.
1992). The individually retained attorneys handle individual client communications, prepare for and attend their client's depositions, take damages depositions,
etc. Id.
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C. MDL Fees
In the last five years, several courts have commented on the
unseemly struggle between groups of MDL plaintiffs' attorneys for a
greater share of the attorney's fees pie or the available overall setdement fund. For example, in In re Thirteen Appeals Arising Out of
the SanJuan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation,"9 the court described
the struggle between the Plaintiffs's Steering Committee (APSC)
and individually retained lawyers over finite attorneys' fees as a war
zone that the court was forced to revisit. "0 The court took matters
into its own hands and decided the controversy because it was reluctant
1
• to prolong
1.
121 a matter, that like the proverbial cat, seems to
have nine lives.
However, two years later the First Circuit was
again faced with many of the same lawyers fighting over litigation
costs stemming from the same case. The court noted that internecine differences (between plaintiffs' attorneys) "as to subsidiary matters-particularly the appropriate allocations from the common
fund for their respective attorney fees and costs-are commonplace. '' 112 Ultimately, the court reversed several PSC costs, including a counting process that gave a profit for photocopies. 12 In total, the PSC was required to return over $1,000,000 in costs to the
Clerk of Court. 124 Obviously, the United States Supreme Court's
admonition that a request for attorney's fees should not result in a
major second litigation
has taken a back seat to the fight for every
25
last available dollar. 1
While infighting among members of the bar is sufficiently unbecoming, the situation becomes even more unseemly when attorneys petition the court for a larger share of the same common fund
from which their clients will be compensated. 116 These petitions
119.
120.
121.
122.

In reThirteen Appeals, 56 F.3d 295 (1st Cir. 1995).
Id. at 299.
Id.
In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 111 F.3d 220, 227 (1" Cir.

1997).
123. Id. at 237.
124. Id. at 239.
125. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
126. Also of great concern is the phenomenon of plaintiffs lawyers formulating
their position on fees issues solely on the basis of whether it will result in a greater
fee. These positions are taken regardless of concerns of precedent, case administration, justice or client well-being. This phenomenon can be seen in the facts
relayed in footnote 2 of In re Thirteen Appeals, 56 F.3d at 300 n.2, where certain
PSC members opposed a larger PSC award because they stood to make more
money in their roles as independently retained lawyers.
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put the attorney in the position of asking for money that might
otherwise go to his clients, making his interests potentially adverse
to those of his clients."' In In re Copley PharmaceuticalInc, for example, the plaintiffs' attorneys asked for 25% of the $150 million
fund (a $37.5 million fee). 128 The court awarded 13% or $19.5 million. 1 9 The amount denied the lawyers-$18 million-went into
pockets of their injured clients.
The future will more than likely bring the continued involvement of the institutional MDL bar which will exert greater pressure
on plaintiffs' net recoveries as more hands reach for a piece of the
Apie. The usual MDL bar members-the so-called expert[s] in
mass tort litigation 130 B will vie for positions on PSC's in high stakes
products litigation nationwide. For example, in the recent FenPhen MDL in Philadelphia, the Wall Street Journal reported that
the PSC includes some familiar faces in mass-disaster cases as well
as lawyers whose experience ranges from suits on behalf of holocaust victims to cable-television subscribers.'
Spots on the Committee were sought after because [A]side from the prestige of running what some said could be one of the largest injury cases ever,
the positions offer financial rewards, assuming the plaintiffs prevail,
with committee members often ending up with the lion's share of
any fee award. 132 Eighty lawyers submitted resumes vying for eleven
spots on the Committee, and the judge held a beauty contest to determine who would get the prize positions."'
Ultimately, the Fen-Phen Common Benefit Attorneys, as they
became known, laid claim to a portion of the recovery of every
plaintiff whose case had been transferred to the MDL. The MDL
court ordered that the defendants pay 9% of every MDL plaintiffs
13 4
recovery to a fund from which the committee would be paid.
The 9% payment would reduce the fee owed to the plaintiffs individually retained attorney. Certainly, this would place the common
benefit attorneys at odds with the individually retained attorney

127. In re Copley Pharm., Inc., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1407, 1409 (D. Wyo. 1998).
128. Id. at 1408.
129. Id. at 1415.
130. In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 111 F.3d 220, 223 (1" Cir.
1997).
131. Http://www.productslaw.com/dietl7.html>.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Pretrial Order 467, In re Diet Drugs Products Liab. Litig., (MDL Docket
No. 1203, U.S.D.C. Pa. 1998).
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who may not have requested, or ever wanted, the PSC's help.
The MDL order further makes clear that in determining the
amount each Common Benefit Attorney will receive from this fund,
consideration will be given to the experience [and] talent of each
CBA in addition to the contribution made by each CBA ....

It ap-

pears, therefore, that once you have established yourself as an expert in mass tort litigation and secure a place on the PSC controlling any given MDL mass tort, you can get a piece of the pie based
on your reputation, with some consideration to the work you may
have actually performed on behalf of your involuntary clients.
D.

The Specter Of Bankruptcy

Not only are more hands now in the MDL pie, the pie itself
can be shrunk by hefty transaction costs associated
... with
136 the pretrial
and trial activities of complex, aggregated litigation.
For example, Judge Parker of the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Texas calculated that in that district's mammoth asbestos
litigation, [tiransaction costs consumed $.61 of each asbestoslitigation dollar with $.37 going to defendants litigation costs; the
plaintiffs receive only $.39 from each litigation dollar. 37 Although
Judge Parker's calculation were with regard to a class action suit,
the same huge transaction costs can easily be encountered in large
MDL.
These costs and added layers of attorney's fees not only limit
potential plaintiffs recoveries but, when added to a defendant's desire to escape its proper measure of liability, can be the catalyst for
driving a products defendant into bankruptcy. The last twenty
years have seen several notable litigation driven bankruptcies, including the numerous asbestos manufacturers' bankruptcies result-

135.

Id. at 3.

136.

While the assumption would be that aggregated litigation would provide

substantial efficiencies for the resolution of individual claims, the available data
suggests otherwise. Report on Mass Tort Litigation, 187 F.R.D. 295, 308-09 (1999)
(citing 1982 RAND study on asbestos cases).
137. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F.Supp. 649, 651 (E.D. Tex. 1990).

These immense transaction costs were calculated by judge Parker in November of
1990. The Fifth Circuit vacated in partJudge Parker's ruling eight years later and
remanded for further trial proceedings. Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d
297 (5th Cir. 1998). The costs, no doubt, have risen substantially, and continue to
rise. But see Report on Mass Tort Litigation, 187 F.R.D. at 309 (arguing that transaction costs in asbestos litigation may have been reduced over time given the development of the Asbestos Claims Facility and Center for Claims Resolution).
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ing from the asbestos litigation of the 1970's and 1980's,13 and Dow
Corning Corporation's 1995 bankruptcy in the midst of the breast
implant litigation. 39 In discussing the asbestos bankruptcies, Judge
Parker laid blame squarely on increased litigation and attorney
costs: the [bankrupt asbestos] companies and plaintiffs have been
victims of a system that has seen a substantial majority of the compensation dollar go to witnesses and lawyers in the form of transac140
tion costs.
There is little doubt that in the future, bankruptcy reorganization will be an alternative of choice of product manufacturers faced
with mounting litigation costs and liability exposure. This is particularly true in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Ortiz v. FibreboardCorp. where the court held that limited fund class
settlements can only be certified where the fund is limited by more
than the agreement of the parties.
The unavailability of negotiated limited fund settlements will give product
defendants fewer
4
negotiated options for avoiding bankruptcy. 1
E.

The MDL: Good Or Bad ?

Generally, MDL transfer has been a black hole. Cases are aggregated in a single court and, with pressure applied from the MDL
bar, are resolved there and never returned for trial by the individual attorneys. While the settlements may allow claimants to opt-out
of the global resolution, MDL judges have proven resistant to a
quick remand of the opt out cases to the local federal district
court's for trial. In fact, the United States Supreme Court was recently forced to clarify that the MDLjudge must remand the cases
back to the local federal district courts for trial, and cannot remand
the case to himself/herself for trial. 43 Prior to Lexecon, critics with a
defense bias noted that this practice created an unfair pressure on
defendants to settle. 44 However, plaintiffs and their individual at138. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 651.
139. In re Dow Corning Corp., No. 95-20512 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. filed May 15,
1995); John F. Nangle, Bankruptcy's Impact on Multidistrict Litigation: Legislative Reform as an Alternative to Exiting Mechanisms, 31 GA. L. REv. 1093, 1093 (1997).
140. Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 651.
141. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
142. Nangle, supra note 138, for an excellent assessment of the extraordinary
litigation costs consumed when an MDL defendant goes into bankruptcy.
143. Lexecon, Inc. v. Millberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes &Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 26

(1998).
144.

E.g.,James M. Wood, TheJudicial Coordinationof Drugand Device Litigation:
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torneys who want to try their cases rather than participate in a
global settlement are faced with the same pressure, especially when
the remand and trial come only after years of slow-moving pretrial
activity in the MDL. While this pressure may ease a bit in light of
Lexecon, all pretrial settlement efforts in these cases will be still be
controlled by a distant steering committee whose own interests may
be better served by a global settlement than the quick remand of
individual cases.145
When the individual plaintiffs case is transferred to an MDL,
that plaintiff and the plaintiffs chosen individual attorney loses a
good deal of control over the case. The major decisions concerning MDL litigation, including discovery decisions and settlement
strategy, will be controlled by the institutional MDL bar acting as
the PSC. The institutional MDL bar has thus become a new breed
of organizational actor at a time when the law is increasingly
shaped by and for large organizational actors. 146 Corporate products defendants are such organizational actors-they consume an
ever increasing amount of the nation's legal resources, are familiar
with the process and help shape the rules of the process. " ' Individuals cannot attain this type of influence over the system since
they partake in the system only fortuitously, in life emergencies,
and are thus not big time players with respect to trying to shape the
rules that govern the arena.148
With its clout and experience, the institutional MDL bar could
balance the influence of the large corporate defendants. It could
influence substantive law and procedures, and bring financial
wherewithal to the table. However, because of the economic incentives MDL players have to pursue their own interests, there has
been much dissension in the bar as to whether the MDL process offers great advantage to injured consumers. Class action attorneys
or common benefit attorneys, especially those who have few individual clients, have an economic incentive to obtain a large global
settlement while the MDL is still pending, prior to remand. Volume attorneys may have the same incentive. Trying each case for
A Review and Critique, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 325 (1999).
145. H.R. 2112, which is currently before the United States House of Representatives, would amend 28 U.S.C. § 1407 to specifically allow the MDLjudge to
retain the transferred cases for trial.
146. Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civiljustice System, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 717, 718 (1998).
147.
Id.
148.
Id.
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them will be prohibitively expensive, and they will do better if the
global settlement provides something for everyone.
These realities put plaintiffs and their individual attorneys (assuming these attorneys are not on the PSC) in a difficult position.
If the attorneys are not on the PSC, they will not generally be involved in the nuts and bolts of the day-by-day MDL litigation.
Unless they have state cases and the resources, i.e. the money and
the manpower, to conduct discovery independent of the PSC and
the MDL, they are left in the position of either taking the deal the
PSC has hammered out or opting out of a global settlement and
trying the case using the PSC generated discovery. 149 Even then,
they may be stuck with rulings and strategic decisions made by the
PSC in the MDL discovery. In the fen/phen litigation, attorneys
with state cases were denied access to the PSC generated work
product unless they agreed to coordinate their state litigation with
the federal litigation via a coordination agreement that allowed the
PSC to obtain a fee from the state cases.1 50 In fact, the fen/phen
PSC even obtained a statement in the order clarifying that the order did not abrogate their entitlement to seek fees in the state
151
court cases.
Certainly, the MDL process has limited the ability of traditional products liability attorneys and individual claimants to pur-

149. It has been opined that Lexecon also prevents an MDLjudge from certifying a class, which would prevent certification of a settlement class. Wood, supra
note 143, at 342. If so, the influence of the institutional MDL bar, which will lose
its ability to control settlement in the MDL, and to skim a profit off the top of
those settlements, will be greatly reduced in the future. But see In re New England
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 183 F.R.D. 33, 38 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding that although questions remain unanswered under Lexecon, class will be certified by MDL court under
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(1)) .
150. Pretrial Order 467, In re Diet Drugs Products Liab. Litigation, (MDL
Docket No. 1203, U.S.D.C. Pa. 1998) and 13c. of the Order states that parties in
each state-court action subject to the state-court order are prohibited from using
any of the PMC's or plaintiffs' work product or products of state-federal coordination described in paragraph 14 of this Pretrial Order for any purpose other than
litigation of actions pending in federal court and action pending in state courts
which qualify for state-federal coordination pursuant to the terms of this Pretrial
Order. In other words, plaintiffs' attorneys who had cases pending in the MDL
could not take the PSC work product (for which they were paying 9% of the total
recovery) and use it in state court cases on behalf of their other clients.
151. Id. The PSC went so far as to preserve their right to seek compensation
for the benefits of their services to attorneys and parties in state court litigation
which is not coordinated pursuant to the terms of this Order, including the benefits conferred by their preparation for and conduct of depositions of generally applicable fact witness and generic witnesses retained by them.
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sue their individual product liability cases independent of the PSC.
State forums are still available, but in many cases there is not a viable non-diverse defendant available in order to keep the case in
state courts. Most defendants will remove a case to federal court if
the case does not include a non-diverse defendant.
Is the MDL process better? An argument can be made that it
is more efficient in handling large numbers of cases, but that begs
the question of whether large numbers of cases would be filed if
each case had to live or die on its own merits. The argument can
be made that if each case had to be tried, the claimants with marginal injuries would never find an attorney willing to take the case
due to the low potential recovery. Similarly, absent a common
benefit fund, the so-called mass tort experts who currently show up
as members of the various PSCs but have few individual clients
would have less incentive to participate in the MDL process. In
fact, it would be interesting to see who would participate in the PSC
(and the number of cases that would ultimately be filed) if the
MDL judge made it clear from the start that the PSC would only receive compensation from their own clients or, in the case of class
action attorneys, if and when a class action was certified.15 Until
that time, the debate will continue as to whether the MDL process
is the best way to adjudicate major products liability litigation.
V.

FEWER BUT BIGGER VERDICTS

While mounting impediments decrease the chances of an individual plaintiffs products liability case getting to the jury, the size
of the average verdict for those who make it through the tort reform, preemption, evidentiary and MDL obstacles are rising. Data
collected from the 1960's through the 1980's showed striking
growth in the size of products liabilityjury verdicts.15 Across various
surveyed jurisdictions, mean and median verdicts increased bsy
nearly ten fold between the early 1960's and the early 1980's.'"
152. As noted above, the United States Supreme Court has cast doubt on
whether-an MDLjudge can certify a class action. Independent of the power of the
MDLjudge to certify a class, more and more courts are refusing to certify class actions in the personal injury context due to the failure of the parties to demonstrate the Rule 23(a) factors. See, e.g. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,
746, 747 (5t" Cir. 1996); Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th
Cir. 1996).
153. Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 1, 39 UCLA L. REV. at 764.
154. Id. at 764-66, n.96-105. The increases were adjusted for inflation and thus
represented real growth. Id. at 780.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2000

31

WilliamWILLIAM
Mitchell Law
Review, Vol. LA
27, Iss.
1 [2000], Art. 11
MITCHELL
WREVIEW

[Vol. 27:1

This trend continued in the 1980's despite increased public and
jury awareness of the alleged tort crisis. While the data is mixed
during this period, and the increases are not as dramatic, the conclusion reached by at least two surveyors was that products verdicts
continued to rise from 1980 through 1989,155 and the 1990's again
found growth in median products awards and rapid growth in
mean products awards.156 The National LawJournal (ANLJ) ended
the decade by declaring that verdicts overall were up, with juries7
awarding record amounts in many categories and jurisdictions.1
NJL's list of top ten verdicts for 1999 included three products verdicts, the compensatory portions of which were $5.3 million, $24
million and $107.6 million. 58 The last, an award totaling $4.93 billion with punitive damages against General Motors Corporation in
favor of a family burned in a159rear end collision, was the largest
products liability verdict ever.
The trend of huge products verdicts has also continued into 2000.'
The reasons for the continued rise in products liability verdicts
have been the subject of much speculation.
While exact reasons
have not been pinpointed, the popular tort reform notion that uncontrolled• juries
have become erratic and widely generous has
•
162
been discredited.
Serious studies of jury awards have not found
juries to be excessive, irrational or overly generous. 163 For example,
the General Accounting Office's study of products liability cases in
five states found that damage awards were not erratic or excessive,
and that compensatory awards were strongly associated with injury
155. Id. at 764-66, n.96-105.
156. Richman, Current Trends in Products Liability Verdicts and Settlements, 550
PLI/LIT 45, 50 (1996).
157. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Raisingthe Bar: Was it the Boom or was it Good Lawyering?, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 28, 2000 at C3 (col. 1).
158. Including punitive damages assessed, these three verdicts were for $295.3
million, $1.024 billion and $4.93 billion. Id. at C3. In total, the NLJ verdict report
included ten products verdicts of over $35 million (inclusive of punitive damages).
Id. at C24 for an index to these verdicts.
159. Id.atAl.
160. E.g., CaliforniaJury Returns $52 Million Verdict in Bronco II Rollover Case,
Product Safety & Liability, BNA March 20, 2000, at 234; A $14.2 Million Awarded in
Suit Over Pickup that Shifted into Reverse, Product Safety & Liability, BNA January 12,
2000, at 5.
161. Eisenberg & Henderson, supra note 1, 39 UCLA L. REv. at 780-89.
162. Id.
163. Guinther, The Jury in America, xiii-xiv (1988); Edith Greene, On Juries and
Damage Awards: The Process of Decision Making, LAW & CONTIEMP. PROBS., Autumn
1989, at 225, 246; Daniels & Martin, Jury Verdicts and the Crisis in CivilJustice, 11
JUST. SYS.J. 321, 325-26, 34748 (1986).
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severity and economic loss. ' 64

Nonetheless, something has led juries to award larger damage
awards where they may have previously been reluctant to make an
award commensurate with the damage suffered. 65 While NLJ has
wondered if it this is due to good lawyering,166 media coverage of
mammoth awards that increases the perception that they are commonplace seems more the reason. For example, studies of tort
coverage in national magazines and newspapers in the 1980's and
1990's showed that, on a percentage basis, coverage of products liability lawsuits far outpaced their actual occurrence.16 Moreover,
the jury verdicts reported in the media were among the largest
rendered and were many times the actual mean verdict rendered
during the period. 16 This situation begins to feed on itself as potential jurors are increasing influenced by the large verdicts that
have been rendered by other similarly influenced jurors and by
media coverage that amplifies the trend.169 And jurors are not only
influenced by reported verdicts in products cases, but also by huge
settlements and verdicts in non-products cases against product
manufacturers. Most notably, the public has been inundated with
tremendous media coverage of the recent multi-hundreds of billions of dollars settlements in state medicare tobacco cases. While
not technically products liability cases,"v the public, including perspective jurors, must assume that these hundreds of billions of dollars being paid to atone for the sale of dangerous products that
caused harm.

164. U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee
on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness, Committee on Energy
and Commerce, House of Representatives, Product Liability: Verdicts and Case
Resolution In Five States (Sept. 1989); Marc Galanter, The CivilJury as Regulatorof
the Litigation Process, 1990 U. CHI. LEGALF. 201, 236 (1990).
165. For example, NLJ reported that in 1999 there were Amassive verdicts in
jurisdictions where jurors had never been known for there generosity. Nat'l L. J.,
Feb. 28, 2000, at C3.
166. Id.
167. Galanter, supra note 145-7.

168.

Id.

169. Another irony: the motive behind some of the reporting of large verdicts
is to portray a system run amok and in need of tort reform; the large verdicts reported just beget more large verdicts.
170. Most of the state cases against the tobacco industry for recovery of Medicare expenditures, including Minnesota's case, were based on theories of consumer fraud and anti-trust.
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VI. THE ULTIMATE SWING BACK To GREATER PLAINTIFFS' RIGHTS
The recent trends in the law toward limiting or eliminating the

rights of products liability plaintiffs to recover for their injuries will
likely continue into the near future, particularly if certain pro-Atort
reform candidates attain high office in the next year. However, the
basic aim of products liability law B to spread costs to those who
can best bear them and best spread them B must ultimately be met,
and will result in the eventual swing back to more consumer
friendly products atmosphere.Products liability litigation has been
estimated
to cost American product manufacturers $300 billion per
171,year. Since this cost is seen as a burden on American business and
the economy, many tort reformers champion doing away with, or
severely limiting, products liability law as a way of saving society
these costs. • The
172 $300 billion estimate has been criticized as a gross
exaggeration.
However, even if the figure were correct, it does
not follow that inhibiting victims rights to recovery will reduce the
cost of accidents or save society money. The costs will not disappear. Products will still inflict their costs-injuries to real live people-but the costs will be borne solely by the unfortunate victims.
A properly functioning products liability system should redistribute these costs by assigning to those injuries a monetary compensation that is paid to the injured plaintiff by, initially, the manufacture but ultimately all users of the product. This is the purpose
of products liability law: "to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that
put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect themselves.
The rationale is
that the manufacturer is both in the best
position
to prevent the
174
harm and to spread and loss if it occurs.
Viewing the compensation paid by a product manufacture as the reformers do-as an expense unrelated to the actual costs paid by the suffering plaintiff,
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172. A very good explanation of the shortcomings in Mr. Huber's math is
found in Mark J. Hager, Civil Compensation and Its Discontents: A Response to Huber,
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and incurred by society in the form of health and assistance benefits and lost wages, productivity and taxes-loses sight of the important cost shifting function of products liability law. Costs17 are not
being created by the law, they are being shifted by the law. 1
Those who see products liability compensation as an artificial
cost, imposed on the manufacturer-consumer relationship from the
outside, miss the fundamental point, indeed the whole point of,
products liability law. It starts from the premise that society must
engage in certain risky behavior, and practical considerations
dicsae176
tate that many behaviors can only be made so safe.
At the margin, little can be done, in the first instance, to reduce the number
or severity of accidents. However, the social costs of accidents can
be reduced by shifting the cost of accident losses, spreading the loss
broadly among people 177 Products recoveries shift the loss to the
manufacturer's deep pocket in the short term and then allow the
manufacturer to spread the loss over all the users of the product. It
raises prices, but insures that all the users of the product pay close
to the true social cost of the goods they enjoy.

If we fail to

spread loses in this way, we actually increase the social cost of the
accident, by putting the burden on those who cannot sustain it,
who in turn consume greater amounts of societal resources to deal
with their plight.
The preoccupation of legislators and commentators with
eliminating accident costs simply by limiting the victim's right to
recover for her injuries, which in turn limits society's available avenues of loss-spreading, has led products liability law so far from its
rationale that there must eventually to be a historical correction.
As the human costs of accidents-suffering, death, poverty, homelessness- go unrelieved, and take a greater and greater toll on society and on family members and friends, there will eventually be a
groundswell of popular opinion to swing the law back to a more
pro-consumer stance. This will be particularly true if good economic times continue, underlining the disparity between those who
create the harm and get away with it and those who suffer the harm
and must bear its full impact. The people who will be clamoring
for a return to greater victim's rights will probably not be aware of
175.
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the need for cost spreading and its role in products liability law, but
they will know what is right, fair and just. Thankfully, the future
gives no indication that the American public's ability to judge and
cherish these principles will be diminished anytime soon.
VII. CONCLUSION

Over the course of the last twenty years, a series of intentional,
and not so intentional impediments have been placed in the path
of any plaintiff wishing to recover for injuries caused by a defective
product. In the near future, creation and expansion of these types
of obstacles, and perhaps additional obstacles, will unfortunately
continue. However, in the long term, rational economics and a
sense of what is right should swing the balance back in favor of
plaintiffs' rights.
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